exposition, as do many opening scenes in Shakespeare's plays, sets the tone for the play by predicting the issues of science and practice of government as the major theme of Measure for Measure.
The word "government" appears only three times throughout the play, while the idea of governing and ruling, as will be explained in the ensuing pages, serves as the predominant motif of actions in this "dark play." 2 With the opening scene in mind, I am going to look into how the play configures or re-configures the idea of government in legal, ethical, and religious contexts. What are represented in the name of law, justice, and truth throughout the play, I would suggest, help us locate early modern governmentality which at once is grafted onto and veers off from the medieval themes of justice and mercy. 3 While drawing upon Debora Kuller Shuger's contribution to our understanding of political theologies in post-Reformation England, I will attempt to trace how Shakespeare's rendition of political delegation and religious confession lends itself to a formative moment of the early modern politico-religious regime. In so doing, this essay aims to explain in what sense Shakespeare's problem play is about the art of government, in both early modern senses of statecraft and governing one's self and thereby show how the art of government becomes the nodal point of early modern subjectivity. The problem comedy is expected to enable us to grasp the early modern idea of government in a somewhat different way from what we see in Shakespeare's tragedies and histories which, more often than not, deal directly with political struggles and monarchical governance. All three usages of the word are related to government as a political and legal institution. In addition to the usage of the opening scene, Isabella employs the word in crying out to the disguised Duke about Angelo's tyrannous exercise of power: "oh, how much is the good Duke deceived in Angelo! If ever he return and I can speak to him, I will open my lips in vain or discover his government" (3. 1.195-97) . The third example is that of Provost who uses the word while explaining how Barnardine's guilt has been confirmed under Angelo's government (4.2.136). 3 For a more theoretical discussion of early modern governmentality, see Kim.
DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY AND ITS LIABILITIES
The opening scene ends up with a royal delegation of authority, a practice which was indispensable in the development of early modern English nation-state since the installment of the Privy Chamber during Henry VIII. Despite his initial compliment to Escalus on the knowledge of government, the Duke decides oddly to give Angelo the full power either to exercise the law or even modify it:
We have with special soul Elected him [Angelo] our absence to supply, Lent him our terror, dressed him with our love And given his deputation all the organs Of our own power. (1.1. [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] Endowing Angelo with absolute power ("In our remove, be thou at full ourself"; 1.1.44), the Duke hopes that Angelo "may in th'ambush of [his] name strike home" (1.3.41). As "a man of stricture and firm abstinence" (1.3.12), Angelo is expected to carry the laws into the "hopeful execution … of [his] commissions" (1.1.60-61). The Duke is seemingly confident that Angelo is the "one that can my part in him advertise" (1.1.42), whose iron fists would root out disorderly behavior with "the needful bits and curbs to headstrong jades" (1.3.20). The Duke suggests to Angelo that a man's virtues are validated only when used for the public good (1.1.30-32). In this address to mobilize Angelo's agreement to serve in his absence, the Duke underscores the good subject's duty to put his virtues to work and thus play the role assigned to him by society or rather by the monarch. 4 This delegation is, from the beginning, presented both as a political ruse to solve the current problem and as a character test of Angelo ("Hence we shall see, / If power change purpose, what our seemers be"; 1.3.53-54).
What lies in the Duke's endeavors is a dexterous mobilization of political subjection by at once separating and conflating private likings and public duties, as in the case of his speech to Angelo on the necessity of pursuing a virtuous life (1.1.27-43). This transfer of power to Angelo brings into question the issue of Vincentio's own government. This delegation of authority has been considered by many critics to be a deceptive way of thrusting upon Angelo the responsibility for what has occurred during the previous fourteen years and thus distancing the Duke himself from the awkward political situation. As Friar Thomas indicates, the Duke himself has the means to resolve the situation ("It rested in your grace / To unloose this tied-up justice when you pleased"; 1.3.31-32), but, instead, opts to shoulder the responsibility on a subject he knows has a faulty character.
Not without hinting at his own share of responsibility in letting the statutes slip, the Duke still wants to avoid blame in the process of their restoration:
I do fear, too dreadful.
Sith 'twas my fault to give the people scope, 'Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them For I bid them do. (1.3.34-37).
While seeking a possible exit from the predicaments caused by his own leniency, the Duke seems to make a precipitous getaway from the ducal responsibility with dubious reasons. He insists that he has "a purpose / More grave and wrinkled than the aims and ends / Of burning youth" (1.3.4-6). By delegating his power to a hard-nosed deputy, the Duke could certainly minimize his own accountability and thereby come out untainted in the end by declaring himself a problem solver. The Duke's intent to see incognito if Angelo "dukes it well in his absence" (3.1.358) surely suggests a kind of Machiavellian tactic, in that he successfully conjures up a rationale for exercising his art of government through a progressive rehabilitation of Angelo's tyrannical exercise of authority. So it is no wonder to hear Marcia Riefer blasting the Duke: "Far from having Vienna's best interests in mind as he claims … the Duke is actually setting up Angelo for a fall while protecting himself … and at the same time betraying the public as well, a public whom he admits he has effectively 'bid' to be promiscuous through his permissiveness" (160-61). Elizabeth Hanson goes further in suggesting that, "figured as a duplicate, the deputy must prove to be duplicitous, a representative who does not figure his own identity" (64-65).
The posture of the Duke as a hermit in withdrawal and contemplation, in this sense, tells no more about his personality than about his notion of government. Throughout the play the Duke seems to embrace the idea of government that associates the knowledge of one's self with the mastery of the realm. The Duke is as much concerned with justifying himself and controlling his image as he is with cleansing the city of sexual license.
According to Escalus, the Duke is, or wants to be, "one that above all other strifes contended especially to know himself" (3.1.488-89), as well as "a gentleman of all temperance" (3.1.492). When the old courtier makes this statement to the disguised Duke without knowing the inquirer's true identity ("I pray you, sir, of what disposition was the Duke?"; 3.1.486-87), this episode comes as no surprise, considering the Duke's profound anxiety over the representation of himself in the eyes of the commoners. The Duke's attempt to oversee the workings of his deputy behind the scenes is ironically anchored on the power of early modern monarch that relies on his/her (in-)visibility. As Jonathan Goldberg suggests ("Power-in-absence is the central stance of absolutism necessary to maintain prerogatives and the secrets of state"; 235), the Duke's disguise shows how the royal excess of visibility and thus of invisibility is aligned with the inverted positions of the discoverer and the discovered.
The seemingly dexterous and manipulative deputation, however, boomerangs to the extent that the Duke turns himself into a subject of his test and contest. His project to reform his wayward subjects, in its course, doubles back on an implicit test of his deputation and government. After all, Angelo turns out to be a symbolic double of Vincentio when he stands in for the absent duke/governor. As Marc Shell points out, "Vincentio, for whom Angelo is the sexual surrogate as well as the deputied political substitute, is, to all intents, the principal caitiff in Measure for Measure, the one whose conscious and unconscious intents Angelo acts out" (93).
Angelo's government is already a liability of the Duke's administrative decision in choosing him over Escalus ("Old Escalus, / Though first in question, is thy secondary"; 1.1.46-47). Hence in the Duke's confident defense of Angelo against Isabella's passionate accusation, we discover a certain kind of irony: "Angelo had never the purpose to corrupt her; only he hath made an assay of her virtue, to practise his judgment with the disposition of natures. … I am confessor to Angelo" (3.1.164-9, emphasis added). We cannot but notice an interesting self-referentiality here in Vincentio's defense of Angelo, as much as in Duke-Lodowick's accusation of the dukedom in 5.1.299-323. In his examination of Angelo's "capacity to govern well, to discharge his responsibilities fairly and conscientiously" (Thatcher 34) , the Duke makes his own practice of dissimulation impressed inevitably upon that of his own deputy. On trial here, therefore, are not only the virtue of the magistrate and his belief in invulnerability to temptation, but the Duke himself and his own government under the guise of delegation.
At first, Angelo lives up to the Duke's anticipation by handing out a rigid punishment of execution to Claudio. Against Isabella's appeal for mercy, Angelo defends himself by arguing that "it is the law, not I, condemn your brother" (2.2.81). Angelo's inflexible notion of government ("the state whereupon I studied"; 2.4.7) leads him to define justice literally: "What's open made to justice, / That justice seizes" (2.1.21-2). When Angelo's sentence comes into conflict with Isabella's plea for a judicious interpretation of the law, what is challenged is Angelo's perception of his power as a deputy that resides in standing fast as "the voice of the recorded law" (2.4.61). But we know well that the royal deputy is given discretionary power and entitled "to enforce or qualify the laws / As to your[his] soul seems good" (1.1.66-67, emphasis added). The Deputy is supposed to uphold the law ("Mortality and mercy in Vienna / Live in thy tongue and heart"; 1.1.45-46), but not without discretionary power for, as the Duke declares, "Your scope is as mine own" (1.1.65). Once again the question may lie in how much discretion a deputy may exercise in standing for the sovereign power.
The subsequent events prove that Angelo is far short of the man whom everybody believes him to be. At first Angelo is said to be a Stoic guru: the Duke considers him as "a man of stricture and firm abstinence" (1.3.12), while the foul-mouthed Lucio calls Angelo "a motion generative that's infallible" (3.1.373). Against Isabella's appeal for mercy to mitigate Claudio's capital punishment, however, Angelo turns himself into the very thing he detests and has just punished in the name of justice. Once he asks Isabella a sexual favor in exchange for her brother's life ("Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite"; 2.4.162), he has to face the dissolution of that personal integrity that has up to now been seen as his strength. His sudden attraction to Isabella gives way to the reckless moment of capitulation: he loses the mastery of himself and defeats himself. Angelo's suppressed desire is at odds with his private principles as well as with his public duty as judge. While going through the conflict between his identity as an ascetic and the newly-found desire for Isabella, his mind oscillates between self-inculpation and self-exculpation. Angelo's dangerous mix-up of private desire and public duty undermines the binary opposition upon which he has built up his own identity. Angelo's confessional soliloquies bring to the surface "the homology of the confessional subject who discloses the 'natural guiltiness' within his bosom and the hypocrite who conceals 'strong and swelling evil' under 'false seeming'" (Hanson 70 ).
The early exchanges between Angelo and Isabella, therefore, bring into perspective the issue of the limits and problems in delegating authority.
The problem of delegation becomes more apparent in the case of Elbow, "the poor Duke's officer" (2.1.169), who, through his verbal confusion, unwittingly endorses the moral economy of Viennese sexual deviance.
Elbow's confusion of "benefactors" with "malefactors" (2.1.49-51), for example, serves to blur the line between authority and deviance, the virtuous and the vicious, and benevolence and malevolence. The Duke's constable, who has been unfairly subjected to this duty for "seven year and a half," only complicates in his report already murky problems (2.1.40ff). In Harry Berger's terms, "the figure of Elbow thus dramatizes the way the Duke's complicity is inscribed in the flawed chain of command and deputation that implicates him in the very disorder from which he tries, by deputation, to distance himself" (357). This whole episode around Elbow thus underscores the current situation of how much the enforcement of law is distorted in Vienna. It is true that Provost and Escalus might be considered as the ideal agents of the law. But Escalus already proves himself ineffective when Angelo frustrates him on the issue of Claudio's sentence, whereas the honest Provost has to tip-toe in the gray area between being loyal and traitorous throughout the Duke's rescue scheme.
When the Provost is praised for his "care and secrecy" by the Duke in the final scene, such an acclaim thus warrants Vincentio's apologetic defense of the Provost's violation: "Forgive him [Provost] , Angelo, that brought you home / The head of Ragozine for Claudio's; / The offence pardons itself" (5.1.535-37).
In the failure of Angelo's government, therefore, Shakespeare establishes a close relationship between political government and the government of one's self. Angelo's perfidy obscures the distinction between "a judge" and "a prisoner," as is epitomized by Isabella's invocation of the judge's affinity with the criminal (2.2.69-70). Even Angelo himself acknowledges in his soliloquy, "Thieves for their robbery have authority / When judges steal themselves" (2.2.179-80). The case of Angelo proves that the corruption of authority is more detrimental to society than Claudio's violation of the law because it strikes at the very heart of government.
Angelo's violation is at once ethical and politico-juridical, which later retroactively justifies the Duke's testing of his own deputy. 5 Inasmuch as Angelo demonstrates that the government cannot always be just, since it is too easily exposed to individual whims, Measure for Measure presents, as a failed ideal of government, the medieval asceticism of saints that Angelo has allegedly pursued at the beginning of the play.
ROYAL DISGUISE AND CONFESSION
Drawing upon the convention of the disguised monarch genre, Measure for Measure represents the practices of government as involving two complementary techniques of supervision and internalization. 6 Disguising himself in friar's clothes enables the Duke to restore order in Vienna. He seems to be successful in employing Angelo as his deputy, while keeping his princely dignity and personal probity intact. In his furtive, voyeuristic scheme, the Duke succeeds in putting his subjects under microscopic observation, and thereby identifying and correcting deviant behaviors.
Vincentio's success in disciplining and educating his subjects, if any, is anchored on his (dis-)guise as a meddling friar that allows him "not only to observe but to shape events as well" (Freeburg 7 
PASTORAL POWER AND CONTENDING THEATER
As shown by his voyeuristic overhearing of the sibling dispute, the Duke is ready to exploit his privileged position. His love of withdrawal is perfectly compatible with his eagerness to spy on the affairs of his subjects. What turns out most subversive to the Duke's pastoral power, however, is neither Angelo nor the criminals such as Pompey or Barnardine, but rather Lucio who loves to mimic the royal monopoly on language and theatricality. Lucio is all too ready to invert official discourse and challenge the royal theater. There is no doubt that Lucio is theatrically successful in producing very climactic and hilarious effects in theatrical performance.
Lucio's distorted statements are subversive of the sovereign power, even though they might be quite acute and accurate. Vincentio finds himself at a loss with Lucio's pungent statement: "It was a mad fantastical trick of him [Duke] to steal from the state and usurp the beggary he was never born to" (3.1.355-56). There is so much in common between Lucio, "a fantastic," and "the old fantastical Duke of dark corners" (4.3.154-55), when Lucio duplicates, with his rhetorical skill, the art that the Duke himself practices. Like a small crack in a dike, the scandal-monger sets off a flood of discord, which directly affects the Duke's anxiety over the representation of himself to the eyes of the commoners. In Lucio, Vincentio sees one of his own kind-someone who loves to appropriate the power of theatricality and the theatricality of power-as is implicit in the scene where the Duke himself makes a similar accusation of himself as an unjust ruler (5.1.296-99).
Keen on his rhetorical and theatrical talent, he mocks the Duke, exchanges sour repartee with the two gentlemen, teases the arrested Pompey with his witticisms, and generates trenchant badinage about Mistress Overdone.
Lucio's theatrical versatility shines, for example, when he goads Isabella to appeal for her brother to Angelo.
With his calumnious remarks about Vincentio ("A very superficial, ignorant, unweighing fellow"; 3.1.400), Lucio invokes a perverse image of the Duke's dark private life. The Duke, in Lucio's presentation of him, becomes a womanizer, an intriguer, and a prodigal: "he would mouth with a beggar though she smelt brown bread and garlic" (3.1.440-41). While this accusation may refer to the leniency the Duke has shown toward sexual behaviors during the past years, those triads can ironically be compared to the Duke's self-representation of himself as "a scholar, a statesman, and a soldier." Lucio's defamatory statements, however vehemently Vincentio contests them, point implicitly to the Duke's problems as the governor of Vienna. Lucio's remark that the Duke "yet would have dark deeds darkly answered, he would never bring them to light" (3.1.434-35) uncannily strikes at the heart of Vincentio's activities. Despite self-justifying and self-exculpatory gestures, the truth is that the Duke himself is a rumor-mill and a dark manipulator (1.3.15; 4.2.193ff). While talking to Friar Thomas just after handing over his power to Angelo, the Duke falsely maintains that it is his "nature never in the fight / To do in slander" (1.3.43-44). 10 But the Duke feels no compunction in spreading false stories about his whereabouts at the beginning or make slandering remarks about the dukedom in the final scene. In the final scene, the disguised Duke himself makes bitter comments on his government, presenting himself as "a 10 Brian Gibbons glosses this phrase as "while I myself am not directly the instrument of disgrace" (95).
looker-on" in Vienna "where [he has] seen corruption boil and bubble / Till it o'errun the stew" (5.1.318-21). Though it appears that the Duke's primary intention might be to test the loyalty of his subjects, we cannot be blind to its obvious irony in this self-critical moment. Such actions surely call into question his punishment of Lucio for "slandering a prince" (5.1.527).
The Duke's reaction to Lucio's slanders on his personality is more than a trivial concern of whether "a fellow of much license" (3.1.461) tells the truth or not. The Duke is deeply concerned with the fact that even the most powerful are subject to public mockery, which is an inherent danger of depending on the power of theatricality. Like the Duke, Lucio himself is a theatrical director on his own: for example, when he tries to coach Isabella how to persuade Angelo in Act 2 Scene 2. Lucio's rhetorical and theatrical buzzing clearly frustrates the Duke's attempt to control his subjects. Simon Shepherd points out that the early modern English establishment took "murmurings" as "a practical political threat" and thus "the ideological devaluing of such 'murmurings' is clearly part of the state's efforts to maintain its secrecy" (31). As a purveyor of public murmurings, Lucio loves to intertwine truth and deception, not much different from what the Duke does. Lucio claims that he knows "the very nerves of state" (1.4.53) and has an intimate knowledge about the Duke ("I was an inward of his"; 3.1.392).
By duplicating the Duke's rhetorical and theater, Lucio proves himself "a spokesman for the play's political order" though maybe not for the Duke's (Hanson 65) . Even when the Duke stages his dramatic return and the restoration of order in the trial scene, Lucio continues to meddle with the ducal theater of power. Thus I agree with M. Lindsay Kaplan that "The Duke condemns Lucio not so much for impugning his authority, but for competing with it. Lucio poses a threat to the state precisely because he usurps the Duke's ability to deploy slanders" (93). By the presence of Lucio the Duke is constantly reminded that "the cast of guises and personae is not ultimately determinable from a single sovereign script" (Davis 102 ).
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH
The final scene of the play provides the Duke with a platform to stage his desire to preserve his reputation and avoid slander by putting Lucio and his tongue under control with an imposition of silence. In fact, the formal, ceremonial closure of the play at once glorifies and problematizes the pastoral fantasy of the Duke that can only come into existence with constant oversight and supervision. Insofar as the Duke here tries to imagine "a public reconciliation of law and morality," the ending qualifies his "redemptive wish-fulfillment of the status quo" . In his spectacular return to the city, in a contrasting way to his stealthy exit in the beginning, the Duke tries to foreclose the slippage of authority-not only in the precise Angelo's stumbling but also in the Duke's own fourteen years of laxity-by configuring the sovereign power both as mediation and as medium between violence and justice. Despite his initial claim that "I love people, / But do not like to stage me to their eyes" 
